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Abstract
In this paper, I analyze the extent to which classical phase tran-
sitions, both first-order and continuous, pose a challenge for interthe-
oretic reduction. My main contention is that phase transitions are
compatible with reduction, at least with a notion of inter-theoretic
reduction that combines Nagelian reduction and what Nickles (1973)
called reduction2. I also argue that, even if the same approach to re-
duction applies to both types of phase transitions, there is a crucial
difference in their physical treatment. In fact, in addition to the ther-
modynamic limit, in the case of continuous phase transitions there is
a second infinite limit involved that is related with the number of it-
erations in the renormalization group transformation. I contend that
the existence of this second limit, which has been largely underappre-
ciated in the philosophical debate, marks an important difference in
the reduction of first-order and continuous phase transitions and also
in the justification of the idealizations involved in these two cases.
1 Introduction
Phase transitions are sudden changes in the phenomenological properties of
a system. Some common examples include the transition from liquid to gas,
from a normal conductor to a superconductor, or from a paramagnet to a
ferromagnet. Nowadays phase transitions are considered one of the most
interesting and controversial cases in the analysis of inter-theory relations.
This is because they make particularly clear the constitutive role played by
idealizations in inferring macroscopic behavior from a theory that describes
microscopic interactions. In fact, it appears that statistical mechanics –
a well-established microscopic theory – cannot account for the behavior of
phase transitions as described by thermodynamics – a macroscopic theory –
without the help of infinite idealizations in the form of mathematical limits.
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In the discussion on phase transitions, physicists and philosophers alike
have mainly been concerned with the use of the thermodynamic limit, an
idealization that consists in letting the number of particles as well as the
volume of the system go to infinity. For many authors (e.g. Batterman
2005; Bangu 2009, Bangu 2011; Batterman 2011, Morrison 2012, Batter-
man 2017) this idealization has an important philosophical consequence: it
implies that phase transitions are emergent phenomena. As a result, they
claim that such phenomena present a challenge for the reduction of ther-
modynamics to statistical mechanics. In particular, the case of continuous
phase transitions that implements renormalization group (RG) techniques
is regarded as especially problematic for the reduction of phase transitions
(e.g. Batterman 2011, Morrison 2012, Batterman 2017).
On the other hand, numerous other authors (e.g. Butterfield 2011; But-
terfield and Bouatta 2011; Norton 2012; Callender 2001; Menon and Cal-
lender 2013) have rejected this conclusion, arguing that the appeal to the
infinite limit does not represent a problem for inter-theory reduction. Most
of them (Butterfield 2011, Butterfield and Bouatta 2011, Norton 2012) have
even argued that phase transitions, including continuous phase transitions,
are paradigmatic examples of Nagelian reduction, whereby reduction is un-
derstood in terms of logical deduction.
In this paper I take the side of the reductionists, but contra the “re-
ceived” reductionist position, I claim that the Nagelian model is not suffi-
cient to describe the relation between the thermodynamics of phase tran-
sitions and statistical mechanics. Instead, I argue that a combination of
Nagelian reduction and what Nickles (1973) called reduction2 provides us
with a much more natural framework for both first-order and continuous
phase transitions. I will also argue that, even if the same approach to re-
duction applies to both kinds of transitions, there is a crucial difference
between them: in the case of continuous phase transitions there is a second
infinite limit involved that is related with the number of iterations in the
renormalization group transformation. I will contend that the existence of
this second infinite limit, which has been largely underappreciated in the
philosophical discussion, marks an important difference in the reduction of
first-order and continuous phase transitions and also in the justification of
the idealizations involved in these two cases, for example objections related
with the singular nature of the thermodynamic limit that apply to the case
of first-order phase transitions do not apply to the case of continuous phase
transitions.
To reach my goal, I organize this paper as follows. In the next section
(Section 2), I describe the physics of phase transitions, outlining how statisti-
cal mechanics recovers thermodynamical behavior. Here I emphasize that in
the RG treatment of continuous phase transitions, apart from the thermody-
namic limit, there is a second infinite limit involved. Subsequently (Section
3.1-3.2), I further develop the concept of inter-theory reduction, distinguish-
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ing between different kinds of reduction and stating the formal and empirical
criteria for each of them. I argue then (Section 3.3) that the most suitable
model for the reduction of both first-order and continuous phase transi-
tions is a combination of Nagelian reduction and what Nickles (1973) called
reduction2, more specifically limiting reduction. Based on that notion of
reduction, I contend (Section 4.1) that, despite some objections regarding
the “singular nature” of the thermodynamic limit (Batterman 2005, 2009),
first-order phase transitions satisfy the criteria for inter-theory reduction.
Later (Section 4.2), I argue that the objections related with the singular
nature of the thermodynamic limit do not apply to the case of continu-
ous phase transitions because the set of limiting operations is not singular.
However, I will point out that there is a different problem in the continuous
phase transitions related with the application of the second infinite limit in
finite systems. In Section 4.3, I will offer a solution to this problem based
on topological and numerical arguments.
2 From Statistical Mechanics to the Thermody-
namics of Phase Transitions
Statistical mechanics aims to account for the macroscopic behavior typically
described by thermodynamics in terms of the laws that govern microscopic
interactions. In the philosophical literature, the reproduction of the thermo-
dynamic results by statistical mechanics is generally referred to in terms of
reduction. In this section, I will describe how statistical mechanics recovers
the thermodynamic behavior of phase transitions and will explain why phase
transitions are an interesting and puzzling case for the project of reducing
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics.
2.1 The Thermodynamics of Phase Transitions
In thermodynamics, phases correspond to regions of the parameter space
(known as a phase diagram) where the values of the parameters uniquely
specify equilibrium states. Phase boundaries, in contrast, correspond to val-
ues of parameters at which two different equilibrium states can coexist. The
coexistence of states expresses itself as discontinuities of thermodynamic
quantities, like volume, which are related to the first derivatives of the free
energy with respect to a parameter such as pressure or temperature. If the
system goes from one phase to another intersecting a phase boundary, the
system is said to undergo a first-order phase transition. This name is due
to the fact that the discontinuous jumps occur in the first derivatives of
the free energy. On the other hand, if the system moves from one phase
to another without intersecting any coexistence line, the system is said to
undergo a continuous phase transition, in which case there are no discon-
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tinuities involved in the first derivatives of the free energy but there are
divergences in the response functions (e.g. specific heat, susceptibility for a
magnet, compressibility for a fluid). An example of a first-order phase tran-
sition is the passage from liquid water to vapor at the boiling point, where
the quantities that experience discontinuous jumps are entropy and volume,
which are first derivatives of the free energy with respect to temperature and
pressure respectively. An example of continuous phase transition instead is
the transition in magnetic materials from the phase with spontaneous mag-
netization – the ferromagnetic phase – to the phase where the spontaneous
magnetization vanishes – the paramagnetic phase (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for the paramagnetic–ferromagnetic transi-
tion. Here H is the external magnetic field and T the temperature.
At the transition or critical point TC the spontaneous magnetization
M vanishes.
Although both first-order and continuous phase transitions are of great
interest for the project of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics,
the latter kind is considered to be more troubling than the former. The
reason is that continuous phase transitions have characteristic properties
that are much more difficult to recover from statistical mechanics than first-
order phase transitions. One of those properties is that, in the vicinity of a
continuous phase transition, measurable quantities depend upon one another
in a power-law fashion. For example, in the ferromagnetic-paramagnetic
transition, the net magnetization M , the magnetic susceptibility χ, and the
specific heat C depend on the reduced temperature t = (T − Tc)/Tc (the
temperature of the system with respect to the critical temperature Tc) as
follows:
M ∼ |t|β, C ∼ |t|−α, χ ∼ |t|−γ ,
where β, α, γ are the critical exponents. Another remarkable property of
continuous phase transitions is that radically different systems, such as fluids
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and ferromagnets, have exactly the same values for the critical exponents,
a property known as universality.
Finally, continuous phase transitions are also characterized by the di-
vergence of some physical quantities at the transition or critical point. The
critical exponents α and γ are typically (although not always) positive, so
that the power laws that have negative exponents (and the corresponding
quantities like specific heat and susceptibility) diverge as T → Tc. The
divergence of the magnetic susceptibility χ implies the divergence of the
correlation length ξ, a quantity that measures the distance over which the
spins are correlated, which also obeys power-law behavior: ξ ∼ |t|−ν . The
divergence of the correlation length is perhaps the most important feature of
continuous phase transitions because it involves the loss of a characteristic
scale at the transition point and thus provides a basis for universal behavior.
The calculation of the experimental values of critical exponents – or ad-
equate relations among them – together with a good account of universality
has been one the major challenges of statistical mechanics. We will see in
Section 2.3 that in order to provide such an account, it was necessary to
appeal to infinite idealizations and to RG methods, an entirely new theoret-
ical framework, which basically consists in reducing the number of effective
degrees of freedom of the system.
2.2 The Importance of the Thermodynamic Limit in the De-
scription of First-Order Phase Transitions
We saw in the previous section that the macroscopic behavior of first-order
phase transitions is defined in terms of singularities or non-analyticities in
the first derivatives of the free energy. Gibbsian statistical mechanics offers
a precise definition of the free energy F , given by:
F (Kn) = −κBT lnZ, (1)
where Kn is the set of coupling constants, κB is the Boltzmannian constant,
T is the temperature, and Z is the canonical partition function, defined as
the sum over all possible configurations:
Z =
∑
i
eβHi . (2)
When trying to use statistical mechanics to recover the non-analyticities
that describe phase transitions in thermodynamics, the following problem
arises. Since the Hamiltonian H is usually a non-singular function of the
degrees of freedom, it follows that the partition function, which depends on
the Hamiltonian, is a sum of analytic functions. This means that neither
the free energy, defined as the logarithm of the partition function, nor its
derivatives can have the singularities that characterize first-order phase tran-
sitions in thermodynamics. Taking the thermodynamic limit, which consists
5
of letting the number of particles as well as the volume of the system go to
infinity N → ∞, V → ∞ in such a way that the density remains finite,
allows one to recover those singularities. In this sense, the use of this limit
appears essential for the recovery of the exact values of the thermodynamic
quantities.
2.3 The Appeal to a Second Infinite Limit in the Case of
Continuous Phase Transitions
In an ideal scenario, one would expect to perform a direct calculation of
the partition function. Unfortunately, analytic calculations of the partition
functions have been performed only in particular models with dimension
D = 1 or D = 2; for all other cases, one requires approximation techniques.1
The most useful approximation for the case of first-order phase transitions
is the mean field approximation, which employs the assumption that each
spin acts as if it were independent of the others, feeling only the average
mean field. Although the mean field approximation proved to be successful
in some cases of first order phase transitions, experiments have shown that
this account fails to give accurate predictions for the case of continuous phase
transitions, in which the correlation length diverges. It is believed that this
failure is due to the fact that mean field theories neglect fluctuations whereas
fluctuations govern the behavior near the critical point (Goldenfeld 1992).
A more complete account of continuous phase transitions requires the
use of RG methods. These methods are mathematical and conceptual tools
that allow one to solve a problem involving long-range correlations by gen-
erating a succession of simpler (generally local) models. The goal of these
methods is to find a transformation that successively coarse-grains the effec-
tive degrees of freedom but keeps the partition function and the free energy
(approximately) invariant. The usefulness of RG methods lies in the fact
that one can compute the critical exponents and other universal properties
without having to calculate the free energy. These methods also allow one to
account for universality, the remarkable fact that entirely different systems
behave qualitatively and quantitatively in the same way near the critical
point.
To give a specific illustration of RG methods, let us consider a block
spin transformation for a simple Ising model on the two-dimensional square
lattice with distance a between spins.2 Here, the spins have two possible
values, namely ±1. If it is assumed that the spins interact only with an
1The first and most famous exact solution of the partition function is the Onsager
solution for an Ising model of dimension D=2.
2For simplicity, I am going to restrict here the analysis to real-space renormalization.
However, the same conclusions apply to momentum-space renormalization. For details on
the difference between real-space and momentum space-renormalization, see Wilson and
Kogut (1974) and Fisher (1998). For a philosophical account on the difference between
those two frameworks see Franklin (2017)
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external magnetic field h and with their nearest neighbors through the ex-
change interaction K (meaning that the coupling constants are only K and
h), the Hamiltonian H for the model is given by:
H = −K
N∑
ij
SiSj +−h
∑
i
Si. (3)
By applying the majority rule, which imposes the selection of one state
of spin based on the states of the majority of spins within a block, one can
replace the spins within a block of side la by a single block spin. Thus, one
obtains a system that provides a coarse-grained description of the original
system.
If one assumes further that the possible values for each block spin SI are
the same as in the Ising model, namely ±1, and also that the block spins
interact only with nearest neighbor block spins and an external field, the
effective Hamiltonian H ′ will have the same form as the original Hamiltonian
H:
H ′ = −K ′
Nl−d∑
IJ
SISJ +−h′
∑
I
SI . (4)
Formally, this is equivalent to applying a transformation R to the original
system, so that H ′ = R[H], in which the partition function and the free
energy remain approximately invariant.3
Although the systems described by H and H ′ have the same form, the
correlation length in the coarse-grained system ξ[K ′] is smaller than the
correlation length ξ[K] of the original system. This follows from the fact
that the correlation length in the effective model is measured in units of the
spacing la whereas the correlation length in the original system is measured
in units of the spacing a. In other words, the correlation length is rescaled
by a factor l. The expression that relates the correlation lengths of the two
systems is:
ξ[K]
l
= ξ[K ′]. (5)
After n iterations of the RG transformation, the characteristic linear
dimension of the system is ln. Thus the correlation lengths in the sequence
of coarse-grained models vary according to:
ξ[K] = lξ[K ′] = ... = lnξ[K(n)]. (6)
3The previous example captures the spirit of real-space RG methods. However in
practice RG transformations consist of complicated non-linear transformations that do
not preserve the form of the original Hamiltonian. This allows for the possibility that new
local operators are generated during the RG transformation (Details in Goldenfeld 1992,
p. 235).
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The idea is that one iterates the RG transformation until fluctuations at
all scales up to the physical correlation length ξ are averaged out. In many
cases, this involves numerous iterations. Details elsewhere, e.g. Le Bellac,
Mortessagne, and Batrouni 2006, Sec. 4.4.3; Goldenfeld 1992, Sec. 9.3.
It follows from equation (6) that for a large correlation length, the num-
ber of iterations should be large. If the original correlation length ξ[K] is
infinite and we want to eliminate all effective degrees of freedom, i.e. we want
the effective correlation length to be small, then we are forced to take the
limit n→∞ in the right hand side of equation (6) such that the following
expression holds:
ξ[K] = lim
n→∞ l
nξ[K(n)] =∞ (7)
This result is important because it demonstrates the existence of two
different infinite limits involved in the traditional approach to phase transi-
tions. The first is the thermodynamic limit that takes us to a system with
an infinite correlation length. The second is the limit for the number of
RG iterations going to infinity that takes us to a fixed point Hamiltonian,
i.e. the Hamiltonian with the coupling constants equal to their fixed point
values: [K∗] = R[K∗]. These fixed points can be also thought of as station-
ary or limiting distributions to which the renormalization group trajectories
converge after infinite iterations of the RG transformation n → ∞. It is
important to emphasize here that this does not mean that the two limits
are “essential” to find non-trivial fixed points, rather it means that if we
take the thermodynamic limit, then we need to take a second infinite limit
in which the number of RG iterations go to infinity. This is related with
the non-commutability of the two limits that I will explain in more detail in
Section 4.3.
Although the iteration of the RG transformation preserves the symme-
tries of the original system, it does not preserve the value of the original
Hamiltonian, and, therefore, it does not preserve the value of the set of cou-
pling constants [K] associated with the corresponding Hamiltonians. Thus,
the iteration of the RG transformation can be thought of as describing a
sequence of points moving in a space of coupling constants Kn or a corre-
sponding space of Hamiltonians H. If the sequence describes a system at the
critical point, after infinite iterations n→∞ it will converge to a non-trivial
fixed point [K*] given by:
[K∗] = R[K∗] (8)
The other possible fixed points are trivial, namely K = 0 and K =∞, which
correspond to low and high temperature fixed points respectively.
At fixed points the coupling constants remain invariant under the trans-
formation. Therefore, varying the length scale does not change the value
of the Hamiltonian and therefore brings us to a physically identical system.
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This latter feature associates fixed points with the property of scale invari-
ance, which means that the system looks statistically (and physically) the
same at different scales.
It has been shown that by linearizing in the vicinity of the fixed point, one
can calculate the values of the critical exponents and the relations between
them (Details in Goldenfeld 1992, Sec. 9; Domb 2000, Sec. 7; Sornette
2000, Sec. 11). This is remarkable because it demonstrates that the critical
exponents are solely controlled by the RG trajectory near the fixed point
and that one does not need to calculate the free energy to determine the
behavior of the system in the vicinity of the critical point. This means also
that the initial values of the coupling constants do not determine the critical
behavior. The latter constitutes the origin of the explanation of universality
because it tells us that systems that flow towards the same fixed point are
governed by the same critical exponents, even if they are originally described
by different coupling constants. The systems that flow towards the same
fixed point – that are in the basin of attraction of the fixed point – are said
to be in the same universality class.
In summary, we have seen that the recovery of the thermodynamic prop-
erties from statistical mechanics usually involves: i) first, the introduction
of particular assumptions (e.g. lattice structure, a particular kind of de-
grees of freedom, ranges of values of the degrees of freedom, and dimension)
that allow one to build a specific model (Ising model in our case study); ii)
second, the assumption of the thermodynamic limit, which brings us to a
fine-grained system with infinite number of particles and infinite correlation
length;4 and iii) finally, the assumption of a second infinite limit that con-
sists of an infinite number of iterations of a coarse-graining transformation.
This limit takes us to a fixed point Hamiltonian that represents a coarse-
grained model. After those steps are made, the most important statistical
mechanical approaches make accurate predictions of the behavior of contin-
uous phase transitions and explain universal behavior. Figure 2 illustrates
this process. Notice, however, that in the case of first-order phase transi-
tions, one could in principle derive the thermodynamic behavior just after
taking the first limit.5
4Recently, Norton (2012) has challenged the appeal to an infinite system in the theory
of phase transitions. His contention is that the limit system would have properties that
are not suitable to describe phase transitions, such as the violation of determinism and
energy conservation. This point is relevant for his distinction between idealizations and
approximations, which led him to the conclusion that phase transitions are a case of
approximation and not idealization. Since we are trying to make a different point here,
we are going to adhere to the standard fac¸on de parler that refers to the existence of an
“infinite system” (e.g. Kadanoff 2009; Fisher 1998; Butterfield 2011). This does not mean
that our view is incompatible with Norton’s view.
5One should bear in mind that although RG methods are not required to infer the
behavior of first-order phase transitions, they can be (and have been) used to describe
these kinds of transitions as well. See Goldenfeld (1992, Sec. 9).
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Figure 2: Inter-theory relation for traditional approaches to continuous
phase transitions.
3 The Concept of Intertheoretic Reduction
What has been at stake in the philosophical debate around phase transitions
is whether the thermodynamic description of these phenomena reduces to
statistical mechanics. Even if the previous section showed that statistical
mechanics can reproduce the non-analyticities that describe phase transi-
tions in thermodynamics, the appeal to infinite limits throws suspicion on
the legitimacy of such a reduction. The main aim of the following sections
is to evaluate whether the infinite idealizations mentioned in Section 2 are
compatible with the reduction of phase transitions. However, given that
the term “reduction” is notoriously ambiguous, before we can assess this
issue, some clarifications as to how this term is explicated in this context
are necessary. This is the task of the present section.
3.1 On the Goals of Intertheoretic Reduction
Since we are interested in relating the thermodynamic treatment of phase
transitions with another theory – statistical mechanics – that aims to de-
scribe the same phenomena, we are treating phase transitions as a potential
case of inter-theory reduction, where reduction is taken as a relation be-
tween two theories (or parts of theories).6 Very often, especially in the dis-
cussion around phase transitions, inter-theory reduction is equated with the
6This kind of reduction is to be distinguished from other types of reduction such as
whole-parts reduction. (See Norton (2012) for a clear distinction between these two kinds
of reduction).
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Nagelian model of reduction (or revised versions of it), which understands
reduction in terms of logical deduction. For reasons that will become clear
below, here I consider a more general notion of inter-theory reduction that
is not restricted to the Nagelian model. A definition that will be useful in
the present context is the one suggested by Rosaler (2017), who understands
reduction as
the relationship whereby one description successfully models all
real behaviors that are well-modeled on another – or, somewhat
more concisely, the relationship whereby one description sub-
sumes the domain of applicability of another. (2)
According to this view, the reduction of a theory Th (generally taken to
be the high level theory) to another Tl (generally taken to be the low level
theory) implies that all real behaviors that can be accurately modeled by Th
can be modeled at least as accurately by Tl. A virtue of this definition is that
it is general enough to account for different models of intertheory reduction
that have been present in the philosophical literature (the Nagelian model
being one of them). These different models of reduction will be regarded
as different strategies to reach the main goal of intertheory reduction which
is the subsumption of the domain of applicability of a theory by another.
Another virtue of this definition is that it is compatible with the variety of
scientific and philosophical functions that have been attributed to reduction.
In fact, domain subsumption can amount to ontological economy, i.e. the
thesis that the behavior described by Th is nothing over and above the
behavior described by Tl, to the explanation of one theory by another or to
heuristic and justificatory functions, depending on the case.
In the case of phase transitions, one would like to demonstrate that sta-
tistical mechanics can account for the behavior that is successfully described
by thermodynamics first for the purpose of justifying the success of ther-
modynamics from the point of view of statistical mechanics (a theory that
we believe is more correct), and second to support the ontological thesis
that phase transitions are nothing over and above the result of the behavior
of atomic interactions. Having said that, the question is now which ap-
proach to reduction, if any, will allow us to show that statistical mechanics
reduces the behavior of thermodynamic phase transitions in the previous
sense. In the philosophical discussion, most philosophers defending the re-
duction of phase transitions have argued that phase transitions are a case of
Nagelian reduction (Butterfield 2011, Butterfield & Bouatta 2011, Norton
2012). In contrast to these authors, I will argue later that the Nagelian
model does not suffice to provide an adequate model for the case of phase
transitions and that a combination of Nagelian reduction and what Nickles
called reduction2 provides us with a much more natural framework for the
reduction of phase transitions, but first I will distinguish between different
kinds of inter-theory reduction.
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3.2 Types of Intertheory Reduction: Reduction1, Reduction2
and Limiting reduction
In his influential paper “Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction” (1973),
Nickles distinguishes between what he calls reduction1 and reduction2.
Reduction1 corresponds to the Nagelian approach in which reduction
is essentially understood in terms of logical deduction (derivability). In
its most strict version, this approach requires the reduced theory Th to be
a logical consequence of Tl plus bridge laws, which have the function of
connecting the vocabulary of Th with the vocabulary of Tl (connectability).
A general formulation of this model is as follows:
Reduction1 : Th reduces1 to Tl iff the laws of Th can be logically
deduced from the laws of Tl along with bridge laws that connect
the terms of Tl and Th.
Inspired by cases in which the deduction of the higher level theory from
the lower level theory is not exact, Schaffner (1967) and Nagel himself (1970)
suggest the following revision of the Nagelian model or reduction1 (some-
times called the Generalized Nagel Schaffner model, for example in Dizadji-
Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann 2010):
Reduction∗1 : Th reduces∗1 to Tl iff there is a corrected version
T ∗h of Th such that (i) the laws of T
∗
h can be logically deduced
from the laws of Tl along with bridge laws and (ii) Th and T
∗
h
are ‘strongly analogous’.
It is clear that in cases of reduction1 in which the higher level theory
is proved to be a logical consequence of the lower level theory, one achieves
domain subsumption in the sense described in Sec. 3.1.7 What is less clear
is whether the same goal can be achieved by reduction∗1. Since domain sub-
sumption requires that the low level theory Tl accounts for the behavior
that is successfully described by the original higher level theory Th and not
by the corrected theory T ∗h , the success of this approach to reduction will
crucially depend on the demonstration that there is indeed a strong analogy
relationship between Th and T
∗
h . Although there is no general characteriza-
tion of “strong analogy”, in most cases this will signify that the two theories
are in close agreement or approximately equal, for example, with respect to
the predictions that they make. Whether or not there is an approximation
relation between Th and T
∗
h will depend on empirical considerations and will
be decided within the specific scientific discipline (Rosaler 2017, Dizadji-
Bahmani et al. 2010). Important for Reduction∗1 is that the approximation
7There is an important controversy about the status of the bridge laws in reduction1
that I will not address here. For a detailed discussion on this issue see, for example,
Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010
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relation should warrant that the corrected theory T ∗h can account (at least
approximately) for the behavior that is well described by Th.
A second type of reduction distinguished by Nickles is reduction2 that
basically consists in the recovery of one theory from another by applying
limiting operations or other appropriate transformations.8 In contrast to
reduction1, reduction2 is not restricted to a single logical relation but can
involve a series of intertheoretic operations. More importantly, in reduction2
the derivation of a theory from another should be understood in a broad
sense including not only logical deduction but also limiting operations and
approximations of many kinds. So, in contrast to reduction1 and also to
reduction∗1, in reduction2 logical deduction may not play any role at all.
Nickles (1973) provides the following characterization of reduction2:
Reduction2: Let Oi be a set of intertheoretic operations, then a
theory Th reduces2 to another Tl iff Oi(Tl)→ Th, where the ar-
row represents “mathematical derivation” understood in a broad
sense including not only logical deduction but also limiting op-
erations and approximations of many kinds.9
Roughly, this schema signifies that by performing a set of mathematical
operations Oi on Tl one obtains Th.
Now, one should note that mathematical operations such as limits and
other approximations are performed not on the theory itself but on functions
(or equations) representing physical quantities. Therefore a more precise
schema needs to be formulated in terms of the relevant quantities and not
directly on the theories to be compared. Moreover, if one wants reduction2
to assure that the lower level theory Tl can account for the behavior that is
well described by the higher level theory Th, one should add informal or em-
pirical constraints.10 As Nickles himself recognizes, in order for reduction2
to hold, it is necessary that the mathematical operations performed on Tl
make physical sense. Although he is not explicit about what he means by
8Some philosophers (e.g. Norton 2012, Batterman 2005) have referred to reduction2 as
the physicist’ sense of reduction and to reduction1 as the philosophers’ sense of reduction.
This distinction is motivated by the fact that philosophers generally speak of a less fun-
damental theory reducing to a more fundamental one, whereas physicists tend to invert
this concept of reduction by saying that it is the more fundamental theory which reduces
to a less fundamental one under limiting operations or other transformations. Since I
believe that both types of reduction can serve to philosophical goals such as explanation
and ontological economy, I will not draw this distinction here.
9For Nickles, in reduction2 one says that the more fundamental theory reduces to
the less fundamental one under certain mathematical operations. This inversion in the
direction of the reduction is motivated by the way in which physicists generally talk about
reduction. Since this is not important to understand this approach to reduction, I will
stick to the philosophers’ jargon.
10See Rosaler 2017 for a discussion of the importance of including empirical criteria in
the different approaches to reduction.
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“physical sense”, one can interpret this constraint as signifying that after
applying a set of mathematical operations on Tl, the resulting theory T
∗
l can
still describe realistic behavior. Taking the limit of a constant of nature to
zero, for example, may result in a theory that does not account for realistic
behavior unless this limit is adequately explained. Similarly taking the limit
of a parameter such as temperature or the number of particles to infinity
may also be illegitimate if these limits are not adequately justified. I will
come back to this point below when I address limiting reduction.
The previous considerations lead to a revised formulation of reduction2
that can be expressed as follows:
Reduction∗2: Given a set of intertheoretic operations Oi, a quan-
tity Ql of Tl reduces
∗
2 a quantity Q
h of Th iff (i) Oi(Q
l) = Qh
and (ii) the mathematical operations Oi make physical sense.
Naturally, in order to obtain the reduction of one theory to another, one
would require that all the physically relevant quantities of Th reduce
∗
2 to the
quantities of Tl under certain conditions. The choice of relevant quantities
will depend on the case study and will be determined by empirical con-
siderations. Proving that all relevant quantities in a theory reduce to the
corresponding quantities of another theory is in every case a huge enterprise,
but note that, according to the above framework, the failure of reduction
of one of the relevant quantities suffices to infer the failure of reduction of
an entire theory to another. As it will be seen in the next section, this is
exactly what is at stake in the case of phase transitions.
A special case of reduction2 is limiting reduction. This kind of reduction
is frequently equated to reduction2, but it is important to distinguish be-
tween these two cases. In fact, whereas reduction2 does not specify the kind
of mathematical transformations that are applied on Tl, limiting reduction
refers to cases in which the transformations consist in mathematical limits.
In cases where one limit is applied, one can express limiting reduction as
follows:
Limiting reduction: Let Ql denote a relevant quantity of Tl,
Qh a relevant quantity of Th, then a quantity Q
h of Th limiting
reduces to a corresponding quantity Ql of Tl iff (i) limx→∞Qxl =
Qh (where x represents a parameter appearing in Tl) and (ii) the
limiting operation makes physical sense.
The requirement that the limiting operation makes physical sense is re-
lated with the justification of mathematical limits. As Menon and Callender
(2013, 201) puts it:
One might not think that a fully reductive explanation has been
given unless one can explain using the resources of the reduc-
ing theory why this model is so effective under those conditions.
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Why does modeling a finite particle phase transition as non-
analytic work so well at the thermodynamic level of description
if finite systems cannot exhibit non-analyticities at the statisti-
cal mechanical level of description? If we cannot give such an
explanation, we have another potential variety of emergence: ex-
planatory irreducibility.
For Menon and Callender, the justification of infinite idealizations is
related with the possibility of de-idealizing the model that uses infinite ide-
alization or, in other words, with the possibility of showing that the behavior
described by infinite systems is well approximated by a finite system. In a
similar vein, Butterfield (2011) suggests a criterion for the justification of
infinite limits (called by Landsman (2013) “The Butterfield Principle”) ac-
cording to which a limit is justified as being mathematically convenient and
empirically adequate, if the values of the quantities evaluated in the limit
at least approximate the values of the quantities “on the way to the limit”,
i.e., for large but finite values of the parameter x0: limx→∞Qx ≈ Qx0 . In
addition, Palacios 2018 points out that it does not suffice to show that the
behavior that arises in the limit arises “on the way to the limit”, but one
also needs to show that it arises for realistic values of x. This latter require-
ment ought to be empirically grounded and is meant to assure that the lower
level theory that results from a limiting operation is empirically correct and
therefore capable of describing realistic behavior.
3.3 Reduction1 and Limiting Reduction Combined in the Case
of Phase Transitions
Now that we have distinguished between different approaches to reduction,
we are in a position to evaluate which one is the most suitable for de-
scribing the case of phase transitions. As said above, most philosophers
(Butterfield 2011, Butterfield and Bouatta 2011, Norton 2012) advocating a
reductionist position on phase transitions have argued that this is a case of
Nagelian reduction or what has been called here “reduction1”. In particular,
Butterfield (2011) and Butterfield and Bouatta (2011) suggest that phase
transitions combine reduction1 and emergence. In their view, reduction1
describes the relationship between thermodynamics TD taken as the higher
level theory and statistical mechanics in the thermodynamic limit SM∞,
which describes a system with “N = ∞”. They claim that since the exact
values of the quantities that describe phase transitions in TD, i.e. deriva-
tives of the free energy, can be recovered from SM∞, one can deduce the
thermodynamic treatment of phase transitions from the latter theory by
defining appropriate bridge laws. On the other hand, they also argue that
the behavior that arises in the limit, i.e. singularities in the derivatives
of the free energy, is “emergent” in the sense of being “novel and robust”
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with respect to the behavior described by finite statistical mechanics SM ,
because – as it was seen in Sec. 2 – strictly speaking the singularities can-
not be derived for finite N . Interestingly, they maintain that this notion of
emergence is “weak” in the sense that approximately the same behavior that
arises in the limit also arises for finite but large values of N . This proposal
is illustrated in Figure 2.
SM∞
reduction1
TD of phase transitions
limN →∞Emergence
6
-
SM
Figure 2: Butterfield-Bouatta schema for phase transitions.
Although Butterfield-Bouatta’s proposal is plausible, this weak notion of
emergence appears to be an artifact of sticking to a definition of reduction
that is far too strict. In fact, if it is true that one can recover the behavior
observed in the limit from finite statistical mechanics for large but finite
values of N , why should we talk about emergence at all in this context? In
fact, we have argued in the previous section that the goal of reduction was to
demonstrate that the behavior that can be adequately described by the high
level theory can be also described by the low level theory; therefore if finite
statistical mechanics can account, at least approximately, for the behavior
described by thermodynamics, then we would have a case of reduction sim-
pliciter. The caveat here is that the intended reductive relationship between
thermodynamics and finite statistical mechanics cannot be described just by
reduction1 (i.e. Nagelian reduction), since the singularities that successfully
describe phase transitions in thermodynamics cannot be logically deduced
from finite statistical mechanics. Instead, the appropriate model of reduc-
tion should allow for limiting operations and other approximations that do
not demand a theory to be embedded into the other. More specifically,
given that the recovery of the quantities that describe phase transitions in
thermodynamics involves first taking the thermodynamic limit in statistical
mechanics and then defining bridge laws to relate the relevant quantities in
both theories, this is a case that (potentially) combines limiting reduction
and Nagelian reduction or what has been called here reduction1. Figure 3
illustrates how this reductive relation would look for both first order and
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continuous phase transitions. Whether or not this reductive framework suc-
ceeds will be addressed in the next section.
First order phase transitions
SM∞
reduction1
limiting reduction
TD of phase transitions
N →∞ 6
-
SM
Continuous phase transitions
Coarse grained model in SM∞
SM∞
reduction1 TD of phase transitions
n→∞
N →∞
limiting reduction
limiting reduction6
6
-
SM
Figure 3: Candidate schema for the reduction of first order and continuous
phase transitions.
Nagelians may say that this schema fits well with reduction∗1 (or the
GNS-model) and that “limiting reduction” just proves that there is a strong
analogy between SM and SM∞. Although one can always adapt the
Nagelian model to cover this kind of cases, the usual characterization of
reduction∗1 does not provide us with a natural framework for cases like phase
transitions. As we saw above, in reduction∗1, logical deduction describes the
relationship between the low level theory Tl and a high level theory T
∗
h , which
is a corrected version of the original theory Th, and the notion of “strong
analogy” describes the relationship between the original secondary theory
Th and the corrected version T
∗
h . The prototypical example for this kind of
reduction is the Second Law of thermodynamics, in which it is argued that
there is a strong analogy between the exact Second Law and the theory that
can be actually deduced from statistical mechanics, which postulates that
entropy fluctuates in equilibrium.
There are two important differences between the derivation of the Second
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Law and the usual derivation of the thermodynamic theory phase transitions
from statistical mechanics. First, in the case of phase transitions one does
not derive a corrected version T ∗h of the thermodynamic treatment of phase
transitions Th. Instead, with the help of bridge laws, one derives the exact
thermodynamic treatment of the phenomena Th, in which phase transitions
are defined in terms of singularities in the derivatives of the free energy.
Second, the derivation of Th from Tl should not be interpreted as logical
deduction since there are limiting operations involved that do not preserve
the content of the fundamental theory. Agreed, Nagelians may still argue
that this is a case of approximative or imperfect reduction1 in which the
derivation of the secondary theory is not exact. Nevertheless, I believe that
this strategy would be misleading. In fact, if we accept that the goal of
reduction is the subsumption of the domain of applicability of a theory by
another, we should not argue that the use of these limiting operations leads
to an approximative or imperfect reduction, but rather to a different kind
of reduction that does not require a theory to be a logical consequence of
the other. Nickles (1973) have presented an alternative model of reduction,
which is meant to describe cases, in which limits occupy a central role in the
derivation of the high level quantities. The limitation of Nickles’ account is
that he restricted limiting reduction to cases of homogenous reduction that
do not require the use of bridge laws. The need for bridge laws in the deriva-
tion of phase transitions means that this case cannot be entirely covered by
Nickles’ limiting reduction. Instead, it is a combination of Nickles’ model
of reduction and Nagelian reduction that provides an adequate candidate
framework for the reduction of phase transitions.
We have argued in this section that the candidate schema for the re-
duction of phase transitions is a combination of reduction1 and limiting
reduction. In the next section we will evaluate whether the proposed schema
actually holds for both first order and continuous phase transitions.
4 Are Phase Transitions Incompatible with Re-
duction?
In order to judge whether phase transitions correspond to a case of reduction
according to the schema presented in the previous section, one needs to
specify which quantities of SM and TD are expected to display the same
behavior. Based on what has been said in Section 2.2, one can observe that
in the case of first-order phase transitions one is interested in recovering from
statistical mechanics the singularities in the derivatives of the free energy
that successfully describe the phenomenon in thermodynamics. On the other
hand, in the case of continuous phase transitions one is not interested in
computing the free energy but rather in calculating the universal quantities
that control the behavior of the thermodynamic quantities, e.g. M , C, χ,
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close to the critical point, in particular one is interested in calculating the
value of the critical exponents α, β, γ.
For the case of first-order phase transitions, the singularities in the
derivatives of the free energy are successfully obtained in the limit theory
SM∞, which allows one to construct bridge laws that relate the thermody-
namic derivatives of the free energy F TD with the corresponding quantities
in “infinite statistical mechanics” FSM
∞
. For the case of continuous phase
transitions, the correct values of the critical exponents are usually obtained
by taking a second infinite limit (iteration limit n→∞) in infinite statistical
mechanics, which allows one to construct bridge laws that relate the ther-
modynamic quantities TD with the quantities defined in infinite statistical
mechanics SM∞. The problem is that in order to reduce thermodynamic
behavior of phase transitions to statistical mechanics, one should relate the
behavior of the thermodynamic quantities not only with statistical mechan-
ics in the limit SM∞, but also with finite statistical mechanics SM . This
implies that we need to show that there is a limiting reduction between
the quantities evaluated in the limit system and the quantities evaluated in
systems with finite and realistic values of the parameters that go to infinity.
Although Batterman and other authors have contended that this cannot be
done, and therefore, that phase transitions are not reducible to statistical
mechanics, I will argue next that there is indeed limiting reduction in both
first-order and continuous phase transitions.
4.1 The Problem of “Singular” Limits and Butterfield’s So-
lution for First Order Phase Transitions
The view that limiting reduction fails in the case of phase transitions has
been most notably developed by Batterman (2001; 2005; 2011), who argues
that this is a consequence of the “singular” nature of the thermodynamic
limit.11
Using Batterman’s terminology, a limit is singular “if the behavior in
the limit is of a fundamentally different character than the nearby solutions
one obtains as  → 0” (Batterman, 2005, p. 226). According to him, the
thermodynamic limit is singular in this sense because no matter how large
we take the number of particles N to be, as long as the system is finite,
the derivatives of the free energy will never display a singularity. As a
consequence, he says that finite statistical mechanics SM does not allow
us to construct a model or theory that approximates the thermodynamic
behavior of phase transitions and that it is only the limit theory SM∞, for
which N =∞, that can provide such an account.
The idea that we can find analytic partition functions that “ap-
proximate” singularities is mistaken, because the very notion of
11Similar views are also held by Rueger (2000) and Morrison (2012).
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approximation required fails to make sense when the limit is
singular. The behavior at the limit (the physical discontinuity,
the phase transition) is qualitatively different from the limiting
behavior as that limit is approached (Batterman, 2005, p. 236).
Based on what has been stated in Section 3, this would mean the values of
the quantities evaluated in the limit theory SM∞ do not coincide with the
limit of values of the quantities obtained in the finite theory as N tends to
infinity and that the first condition for limiting reduction fails:
lim
N→∞
QSMN 6= QSM∞ .
Although, it is true that the singularities in the derivatives of the free
energy can only be obtained in the limit N = ∞, Butterfield (2011) (and
Butterfield and Bouatta (2011)) correctly points out that this does not mean
that finite statistical mechanics cannot approximate the values obtained in
the limit N =∞. He illustrates this point with the following mathematical
example. Consider the following sequence of functions:
gN (x) =

−1 if x ≤ −1/N
Nx if − 1/N ≤ x ≤ 1/N)
1 if x ≥ 1/N
As N goes to infinity, the sequence converges pointwise to the discontin-
uous function:
g∞(x) =

−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
One can introduce another function f , such that
f =
{
1 if g is continuous
0 if g is discontinuous
If one focuses on f , then one may conclude, in the same vein as Batterman,
that the value of f∞ at the limit N =∞ is fundamentally different from the
value when N is arbitrarily large but finite and that limiting reduction fails.
However, Butterfield warns us that if we look at the behavior of the function
g, we will see that the limit value of the function is approached continuously
and therefore that the limit system is not “singular” in the previous sense,
so that limN→∞gN = g∞ holds.
According to Butterfield, this is exactly what happens with classical
phase transitions and, for the case of first-order phase transitions, he seems
20
right.12 In fact, in a system containing a finite number of particles and con-
fined to a restricted geometry, the thermodynamic quantities that describe
first-order phase transitions such as density and magnetization are analytic
and vary smoothly with the relevant parameters of the problem. Therefore,
if we introduce a quantity H representing the discontinuity of such quan-
tities and attribute a value 1 to H if the quantity is discontinuous and 0 if
it does not (analogously to the function f in Butterfield’s example), then
we might conclude that such a quantity has values evaluated at the limit
N = ∞ that are considerably different from the values of the of systems
“on the way to the limit”, i.e. for finite N . However, if we focus on the
behavior of the thermodynamic quantities themselves, namely density for
the liquid-gas transition and magnetization for the change of magnetization
of a ferromagnet at sub-critical temperatures, we will arrive at a different
conclusion. In fact, as N grows, the change in the thermodynamic quanti-
ties becomes steeper and steeper so that the quantities smoothly approach a
discontinuity in the limit (analogous to the function g). More importantly,
a theoretical analysis of those situations also show that these limits make
physical sense, since one can demonstrate that for realistic values of N ,
the gradient in the derivatives of the free energy FSM is sufficiently steep
so that the difference in the limit values of the thermodynamic quantities
as N → ∞ and realistic systems with finite N0 becomes negligibly small:
limN→∞ FSMN ≈ FSMN0 . (Schmelzer and Ulbricht 1987, Fisher and Berker
1982). As Kadanoff (2009, p. 783) puts it:
As the number of lattice sites gets larger the variation in the
magnetization will get steeper, until at a very large number of
sites the transition [...] will become so steep that the casual
observer might say that it has occurred suddenly. The astute
observer will look more closely, see that there is a very steep rise,
and perhaps conclude that the discontinuous jump only occurs
in the infinite system.
The important lesson from Butterfield’s argument is that the “singular”
nature of the thermodynamic limit does not imply that there are no models
of statistical mechanics that approximate the thermodynamic behavior of
phase transitions, for N sufficiently large but finite. For him, this should be
taken as supporting the claim that the discontinuities that describe phase
transitions in the limit are not physically real, but rather that they approx-
imate the behavior of realistic systems. For us, this should be taken as an
12Even if Butterfield aims to make a more general claim, this does not hold for all
cases of “singular” limits. Landsman (2013) shows that for the case of quantum systems
displaying spontaneous symmetry breaking and the classical limit h¯ → 0 of quantum
mechanics, the situation is different and much more challenging. It seems therefore that
the analysis of singular limits and the way of “dissolving the mystery” around them should
be done on a case-by-case basis.
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argument in favor of the existence of limiting reduction between SM and
SM∞.
One needs to be cautious, however, in not concluding that the previous
argument solves all the controversy around the reduction of phase transi-
tions. First of all, it is important to bear in mind that we are referring only
to classical phase transitions and that quantum phase transitions have not
been considered.13 Second, one needs to note that we have not considered
the use of renormalization group methods yet, in which there are two infinite
limits involved. This is precisely the issue that we are going to address next.
4.2 Dissolving the Problem of Singular Limits for Continu-
ous Phase Transitions
As was shown in Section 2, the inference of the thermodynamic behavior of
continuous phase transitions generally requires the appeal to RG methods.
Batterman (2017) has suggested that the assumption of RG methods poses
a further challenge for the project of reducing phase transitions to statistical
mechanics. He attributes this difficulty to the need for the thermodynamic
limit in the inference of fixed point solutions, which are said to be neces-
sary for the computation of critical exponents and for giving an account of
universality. He claims (Batterman 2017, p. 571):
Crucial, of course, to finding a fixed point, is the fact that at
criticality the correlation length diverges. Unless one has cor-
relations of infinite extent, the iterative blocking procedure will
get hung up at a given length scale and one will not find the
fixed point.
Batterman associates the essential role played by the correlation length
with the singularity of the thermodynamic limit. However, what he over-
looks is that in continuous phase transitions there is a second infinite limit
n → ∞ involved, which corresponds to iterating infinitely many times
the RG transformations. Realizing that there is a second limiting op-
eration is important because it allows us to see that the set of mathe-
matical limits involved in the statistical mechanical treatment of contin-
uous phase transitions is not singular in Batterman’s sense. In fact, once
the thermodynamic limit is taken, the infinite iteration limit approaches
smoothly the non-trivial fixed solutions K that allow one to calculate the
values of the critical exponents, so that the following expression holds:
limn→∞ limN→∞KSMN,n = K
SM∞ . This is a consequence of the analytic-
ity of the renormalization group flow, which is a basic assumption of the
RG framework. The problem is rather that these two limits do not com-
mute since for large but finite values of N , the second infinite limit n→∞
13For an analysis of quantum phase transitions see Landsman (2013).
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leads to trivial fixed points K∗ that do not allow one to calculate the correct
values of the critical exponents. In other words, this means that for large
but finite N : limn→∞KSMn 6= KSM∞ . The reason for this result is – as
we saw in Sec. 2 – that in every finite system there will be a characteristic
length scale associated to the size of the system. Therefore, the application
of a coarse-graining transformation beyond that length will no longer give
identical physical systems and the “RG flow” will inevitably move towards
a trivial fixed point, with values of the coupling constants either K = 0 or
K =∞.
If we recall the conditions for limiting reduction mentioned in section
3, we will see, however, that the previous result does not imply a failure
of limiting reduction between the quantities evaluated in finite statistical
mechanics SM and the limit theory SM∞ for which N =∞ and n =∞. In
fact, limiting reduction requires (i) that the quantities evaluated in the limit
theory can be recovered by performing a set of limiting operations on the
low level theory, and (ii) that these limiting operations make physical sense.
We have seen here that the values of the critical exponents can be actually
recovered by the set of infinite limits performed on statistical mechanics and
that the set of limiting operations is not singular so that condition (i) holds.
In the next section, we will see that the mathematical limits involved in the
treatment of continuous phase transitions also make physical sense.
4.3 Justifying the thermodynamic limit and the infinite it-
eration limit for Continuous Phase Transitions
Since the goal of limiting reduction is to demonstrate that the lower level
theory can account for the behavior that is well described by the high level
theory, the limiting operations should make physical sense. This means that
as N → ∞ and n → ∞ the quantities should still be able to describe the
behavior of realistic systems. In the case of first-order phase transitions,
where there are no renormalization group methods involved, the relevant
quantities that describe a phase transitions, such as density, approximate the
behavior of the quantities evaluated in the limit not only for large and finite
values of N , but also for realistic values of the parameter. The challenge
for the reductionist is to show that the two limiting operations involved in
the statistical mechanical treatment of continuous phase transitions are also
physically meaningful in the previous sense, in other words, that the fixed
point solutions obtained by taking two infinite limits can be also obtained,
at least approximately, in systems with finite values of N . Even philosophers
with a reductionist bent towards phase transitions are still skeptical about
the possibility of approximating non-trivial points in finite systems. Menon
and Callender (2013, p. 219), who endorse in general the reducibility of
phase transitions, say for instance:
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There does not seem to be a clear sense in which the renormaliza-
tion flow of finite systems can approximate a fixed point. A point
is either a fixed point for the flow or it isn’t; it can’t be “almost”
a fixed point. And unlike Butterfield’s example, there does not
seem to be a way of re-phrasing the explanation of universality
in terms that are approximated by large finite systems.
The problem, as we saw, is that when we apply the infinite iteration
limit n → ∞ in a system with finite N and finite correlation length, the
system will approach trivial fixed points that do not allow one to calculate
the values of the critical exponents that can be successfully calculated when
the two limits are performed. The reason for this is that the two limits
do not commute. Indeed, if one takes the infinite iteration limit after the
thermodynamic limit, one obtains the correct results, but if one takes the
infinite iteration limit before taking the thermodynamic limit, i.e. in a finite
system, one ends up in a trivial fixed point that do not allow one to compute
the correct values of the critical exponents. It appears, therefore, that the
values of the quantities evaluated in the limits N = ∞ and n = ∞ do not
approximate the values of the quantities evaluated in realistic systems with
finite N .
What the reductionist needs to realize, however, is that the infinite iter-
ation limit is needed only if we consider an infinite system. If we consider
a finite system, there is no need to take the infinite iteration limit. Fur-
thermore, one should not take the infinite iteration limit. In fact, if one
could demonstrate that the limit values of the quantities as N → ∞ and
n → ∞ can be approximated by the quantities evaluated in finite system
with realistic value of N0 and “before” we get to the infinite iteration limit,
i.e. for finite values n0, one would have every reason to conclude that the
infinite limits are physically significant and, therefore, that this a case of
limiting reduction. Batterman (2017) seems to recognize this point but he
is skeptical about the possibility of finding fixed points after a finite number
of iterations. In a footnote (p. 571), he writes:
It seems to me that if one is going to hold that the use of the
infinite limits is a convenience, then one should be able to say
how (even if inconveniently) one might go about finding a fixed
point of the RG transformation without infinite iterations. I
have not seen any sketch of how this is to be done. The point
is that the fixed point, as just noted, determines the behavior of
the flow in its neighborhood. If we want to explain the universal
behavior of finite but large systems using the RG, then we need
to find a fixed point and, to my knowledge, this requires an
infinite system.
Fortunately for the reductionist, there are topological and numerical
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arguments supporting the possibility of calculating non-trivial fixed points
in finite systems. In order to understand those arguments, one needs to study
first the topology of the renormalization group flows. Figure 4 describes a
contour map sketching such a topology and serves to illustrate the situation.
Here the RG flows are represented by the trajectories R and D in a space
S of Hamiltonians. Each point in this space represents a physical system
described by a particular Hamiltonian associated with a set of coupling
constants K. In this topology, the elements of S can be classified according
to their correlation lengths ξ. Therefore, one can define surfaces containing
all Hamiltonians H ∈ S with a given correlation length. The critical surface
describes the set of all Hamiltonians with infinite correlation length ξ =∞.
In the figure, p represents a system with a Hamiltonian that inhabits the
critical surface ξ = ∞, whereas s represents a system with a Hamiltonian
that is infinitesimally close to p but is not on the critical surface; p∗ and
p0 are fixed points. As one can see, the trajectory D starting from s will
stay close to trajectory R, describing a system at criticality, but eventually
will move away towards a trivial fixed point p0. This follows because in a
finite system the RG transformation will constantly reduce the value of the
correlation length, moving the system away from criticality and resulting in
a system with trivial values of coupling constants. Since the values of the
critical exponents can be calculated by linearizing around non-trivial fixed
points, this naturally means that iterating the RG transformation infinitely
many times in a finite system will lead us to a fixed point from which one
will be able neither to compute the critical exponents nor to give an account
of universality.
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Figure 4: Contour map sketching the topology of the renormalization
group flow (R). s and p represent systems infinitesimally close to each
other. p∗ is a critical fixed point and p0 is a trivial-fixed point. The
region around the fixed point p∗ represents neighboring points.
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Despite the previous result, Wilson and Kogut (1974, Sec. 12) demon-
strated by using -expansion approximation that in principle, and for an
idealized case, if one starts from a point which is close enough to the critical
surface, represented by “s” in Figure 3, the RG trajectory D will move close
to the critical trajectory until it reaches the vicinity U of a non-trivial fixed
point p∗.14 Once the trajectory reaches the neighborhood U of the fixed
point p∗ will stay there for a long time (which means, for repeated iterations
of the RG transformation), thereby acting as it were a fixed-point d′. Fi-
nally, as n→∞, the trajectory will eventually move away from that region
approaching a trivial fixed point. What is relevant for us is that within the
neighborhood U and from an “effective” fixed point d′ linearization is in-
deed possible and allows for the calculation of accurate values of the critical
exponents. The latter implies that the values of the critical exponents eval-
uated in a finite system after a finite number of iteration n0 can in principle
approximate the values of the critical exponents obtained after taking the
limits N → ∞ and n → ∞ so that the behavior that arises in the limit is
approximated by the behavior for large but finite values of N and n:
KSMN0,n0 ≈ limn→∞ limN→∞K
SM
N,n .
Yin (2011), based on previous work done by Haller and Kennedy (1996),
reinforces this conclusion by deriving an upper bound for the linearization in
the neighborhood of non-trivial fixed points, which helps estimate the error
associated with the linear approximation. It is important to note, however,
that in order to derive accurate values of the critical exponents, the number
of iterations of the RG transformations should be large enough so that all
details which are not universal, namely all details specific to a model, are
washed out. If the number of iterations is not large enough the coupling
constants will be sensitive to details of the model and the calculations of
critical exponents will not be accurate (For details see also Le Bellac et. al
1998).
One might object that the previous results rely too much on an idealized
case and they do not serve to describe realistic situations. Although it is
true that in practice things are less straightforward, Monte Carlo simulation
gives an important support for the claim that finite systems with more re-
alistic values of N will display the desired behavior. Since 1976 there have
14The -expansion is an asymptotic expansion for which  takes values from  = 1 to
 << 1. Since the exponents are not analytic at  = 0 one faces convergence problems
which are treated by sophisticated summation methods that are nowadays under control.
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been attempts to use the numerical Monte Carlo simulation in the frame-
work of renormalization group methods for the study of critical exponents.
The first contribution in this direction was made by Ma (1976), who sug-
gested an application of real space RG methods that required the calculation
of the renormalized Hamiltonians. However, since calculating the renormal-
ized couplings accurately enough proved to be too difficult, this approach
did not succeed in determining the fixed point Hamiltonian with signifi-
cant precision. Pawley, Swendsen, and Wilson (1984) made further progress
in this direction by suggesting an approach based on expectation values of
the correlation functions that did not rely on the calculation of renormalized
Hamiltonians. Using this approach, they showed that for an Ising square lat-
tice with 64 number sites, the system approaches the behavior of an infinite
system after two iterations of a RG transformation. After more iterations,
however, the system was shown to depart from the expected results flowing
towards a trivial fixed point. A plausible explanation for this cross-over was
that after more iterations the correlation length became comparable to the
size of the system and finitary effects became relevant. Mainwood (2006),
Butterfield (2011) and Menon and Callender (2011) stress the possibility
of cross-over but since they did not offer a topological explanation of the
two infinite limits involved in the treatment of continuous phase transitions,
they did not succeed in giving a rebuttal argument for the reduction of
continuous phase transitions. On the other hand, the arguments presented
here give us good reason to conclude that the behavior derived in the limits
N → ∞ and n → ∞ can be approximated by the behavior “on the way to
the limit” and, moreover, for realistic values of N . If the ultimate goal of
inter-theory reduction is to demonstrate that the low level theory can ac-
count for the behavior that is successfully described by the high level theory,
then, based on the previous arguments, we have all reasons to conclude that
the thermodynamics of phase transitions reduces to statistical mechanics.
4.4 On the Indispensability of Infinite Limits
In this section we have addressed the issue of whether phase transitions
reduce to statistical mechanics. A different issue that has been at stake in
the philosophical literature is whether the infinite limit is “essential” to give
an account of phase transitions. Although this is not the topic of this paper,
I will allow myself a short note on this matter. Here we have said that the
behavior of the quantities that successfully account for phase transitions in
the limits N and n approximate the behavior of the corresponding quantities
evaluated in systems with finite values of N and n. This might well lead
one to the conclusion that the infinite limits invoked in the theory of phase
transitions are not essential and that it would be possible to construct a finite
theory of phase transitions that do not invoke infinite limits at all. Even if
I believe that one should not rule out the possibility of constructing such a
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theory – in fact there have been attempts to do so (e.g. Gross 2001, Casetti
and Kastner 2006, Borrmann, Mu¨lken, and Harting 2000) –, it is important
to emphasize some epistemic roles of the infinite limits.15. First of all, the
appeal to infinite idealizations makes calculations more tractable. Indeed,
it is generally easier to work with infinite sums rather than with large but
finite sums. Second, and more importantly, it allows us to remove irrelevant
details, such as finitary effects. In fact, in any finite system the finitary
or edge effects become relevant when the correlation length approaches the
size of the system. Finally, infinite idealizations allow us to provide more
rigorous definitions for phase transitions. As we saw previously, the concept
of non-analyticity and scale invariance is well-defined only in the limit.16
5 Concluding Remarks
The arguments presented in this paper give us good reason to think that
the appeal to the infinite limits in the theory of phase transitions does not
represent a challenge for inter-theory reduction. In fact, I have argued that
both first-order and continuous phase transitions fit well with a notion of
inter-theory reduction that combines limiting reduction and Nagelian re-
duction.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that phase transitions are not incon-
sistent with other notions of reduction that have also been discussed in the
philosophical literature. Norton (2013), for instance, correctly points out
that the case of continuous phase transitions does not satisfy what he calls
“few-many reduction”, according to which there will be a reduction if the
behavior of a system with a few components can be used to explain the
behavior of a system with a large number of them. The reason for this is
that continuous phase transitions are intrinsically fluctuation phenomena
that can only arise when N is sufficiently large. This is certainly an inter-
esting sense in which reduction “fails” for the case of phase transitions, but
since traditional statistical mechanics is in general a theory that describes
systems with large N, this failure of reduction is not incompatible with the
inter-theoretic reduction between thermodynamics and classical statistical
mechanics.
Likewise, continuous phase transitions also seem to be at odds with the
kind of reductive explanation that requires the explanans to give us accu-
rate and detailed information about the microscopic causal mechanisms that
produce the phenomenon (e.g. Kaplan 2011). As has been pointed out by
Batterman (2002), Batterman and Rice (2014) and Morrison (2012), the im-
15For a philosophical discussion on the indispensability of infinite limits see Ardourel
(2018)
16See Mainwood (2006) for a more detailed description of the roles of the thermodynamic
limit.
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possibility of giving such an account is related to the robustness of the fixed
point solutions under different choices of the initial conditions. This implies
that the critical behavior is largely independent of specific microscopic de-
tails characterizing the different models and that the statistical mechanical
account of phase transitions does not give us complete information about
the microscopic mechanisms underlying the transitions. This of course tells
us something about the limitations of statistical mechanics, but, again, does
not impede the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics.
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